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ABSTRACT
As it becomes cheaper to copy and share digital content, vendors are turning to technical protections
such as encryption. We argue that if protection is nevertheless imperfect, this transition will
generally lower the prices of content relative to perfect legal enforcement. However, the effect on
prices depends on whether the content providers use independent protection standards or a shared
one, and if shared, on the governance of the system. Even if a shared system permits content
providers to set their prices independently, the equilibrium prices will depend on how the vendors
share the costs. We show that demand-based cost sharing generally leads to higher prices than
revenue-based cost sharing. Users, vendors and the antitrust authorities will typically have different
views on what capabilities the DRM system should have. We argue that, when a DRM system is












As copying of digital content has become easier, content vendors have started to use
technical protections rather than relying on legal protections. Technical protections,
such as encryption and copy controls, are often lumped together under the name
“digital rights management (DRM).” The purpose of this paper is to understand how
the transition from legal to technical protections aﬀects the pricing of digital content
when the DRM system is implemented by the content vendors themselves rather than
by third-party providers.
Competition requires that the vendors set their prices independently. The
technical capabilities built into a shared DRM system can either facilitate or obstruct
independent pricing of content. However, the outcome in the market will also depend
on the vendors’ incentive to price competitively, which is aﬀected by how the vendors
share the costs of the system. We show that, even with independent price-setting,
competition may be compromised by cost sharing.
Technical protections have been evolving since the 1980s. Some have been
industry-wide eﬀorts, for example the legally mandated Serial Copy Management Sys-
tem for digital audio tape that was authorized by Congress. This system caused
the quality of copies to degrade, so that, as with analog audio tapes, it was hard to
make faithful copies of copies. The solution was inelegant at best, but in any case
became obsolete due to the proliferation of other digital mediums. Other measures
were introduced by vendors themselves, such as the one-installation features imposed
by some distributors of computer software. One-installation features were rapidly
circumvented.
As content distribution has moved to the Internet, watermark and encryption
technologies have developed. A watermark, by analogy with a watermark on paper
stationery, is a piece of software code embedded in a program. If illicit copies of
the software circulate, the watermark can identify the original buyer or licensee of
the copy that is circulating. This may or may not be useful, depending on whether
the original buyer or licensee can be held liable. Encryption systems attempt to make
digital content uninterpretable or inaccessible without use of a code key. The code key
1generally authorizes playing the content on a speciﬁc piece of hardware. For example,
the movie industry has developed digital versatile disks (DVDs), which are protected
by a technology called the Content Scrambling System (CSS). CSS authorizes access
b ym a t c h i n gac o d ee m b e d d e di nd i s k st oac o d ee m b e d d e di nD V Dp l a y e r s .A m o n g
other purposes, this system ensures that movies released for viewing in one region of
the world cannot be viewed in another.
The DVD technology is just one example of a system shared by multiple ven-
dors. Shared DRM systems raise a host of issues regarding ownership, licensing,
and price control over players as well as content. For DVDs, both the hardware and
software are proprietary, and jointly licensed. On the hardware side, Toshiba admin-
isters the licenses, charging per-unit license fees on the sale of DVD media, players,
and decoders. The collected fees are then distributed to the patent holders (Hitachi,
Matsushita Electric, Time Warner, Toshiba, and Victor) proportionally to each mem-
ber’s holdings in the patent portfolio. On the software side, the Motion Pictures
Expert Group (MPEG), which includes manufacturers of players, content companies,
and others, use similar terms to license the digital video and audio algorithms (called
“codecs”) used on DVDs and digital television. Finally, the DVD Copy Control Associ-
ation (DVD-CCA), controlled primarily by the content industry, licenses the technical
protection measure known as the Content Scramble System (CSS). These license fees
are linked to players rather than to usage of digital content.
The license on DVD hardware is for a “pool” of patents. Patent pooling for
standardization is generally thought to be pro-competitive, barring practices that
are anticompetitive or not necessary for the dissemination of intellectual property
(Shapiro 2001). The Department of Justice Antitrust Division issued favorable review
letters on both the DVD and the MPEG licensing agreements. Notably, however,
the review of these agreements focused almost entirely on the competitive eﬀects in
player markets. As the licensing fees were only at the encoding/decoding level in the
physical media, the eﬀect on the content market was assumed to be minimal, and only
brieﬂy considered. Similarly, in VirginMega v. Apple, the French antitrust authorities
considered (and dismissed) an antitrust claim to force licensing of FairPlay, the DRM
2system used for Apple’s iTunes Music Store. Again, the arguments were focused on
the market for players (iPods), rather than the market for music.
In this paper we are concerned with the market for content, rather than with
the market for players. From an economic perspective, disentangling the relationship
between the the content market and the player market is not trivial, since the demand
for players is derived from the demand for content. And from a technical perspective,
standardization of technical protections does not necessarily require standardization of
players, or vice versa. A given DRM system can be implemented on diﬀerent players,
and a given player can be compatible with diﬀerent DRM systems.
The main harm that might arise from cartelization of the player market is that
it could divert proﬁt from creators, and thus erode the incentive to create. Since the
ultimate source of value in the player markets is content, there is a natural antidote
to cartelization in the device market: content vendors can implement and maintain
their own protection system(s), and players can be made compatible with each vendor’s
system. However, that solution might introduce new possibilities for competitive harm.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the eﬀect on content prices when digital rights
management is under the control of the content providers.
Key to our analysis is that the strength of protection is endogenous, and has
an eﬀect on prices. We also recognize that vendors must choose whether to implement
independent systems or share a common one. An advantage of sharing is that it
reduces setup costs. A disadvantage is that the shared system is a more attractive
hacking opportunity — a single hack gives access to more content. The shared system
must therefore provide a higher level of protection.
In sections 2 and 3, we show that a threat of circumvention reduces prices
relative to perfect legal enforcement. This is because the optimal way to deter cir-
cumvention is a combination of lower prices (giving up revenue) and protection (paying
costs). However, despite the lower prices, we show that vendors as well as users may
prefer technical protection. Even if per-period proﬁt is smaller with technical pro-
tections, there is no necessary end to protection by technical means. In section 2
we discuss a single vendor, and in section 3, we introduce competition between two
3vendors, and show that a threat of circumvention reduces prices whether the vendors
compete on prices or collude. We also show that the vendors’ incentives to share a
system are not perfectly aligned with eﬃciency. For example, because of price eﬀects,
vendors may share a system when it would be less costly to use independent systems.
Section 4 illustrates these results in an extended example.
Even though collusion through a shared system may improve the welfare of
users relative to perfect legal enforcement, the antitrust authorities may want to set
rules about the technology. For example, they may insist on mechanisms that preserve
independent pricing. In sections 5 and 6, we ask to what extent independent pricing
is possible with a shared system. We show that, even if the DRM system permits the
vendors to set their prices independently, the rules for sharing the costs of the system
may have a collusive eﬀect. We show that demand-based cost sharing is more collusive
than either revenue-based cost sharing or ﬁxed cost shares.
The ideas in this paper are related to an older literature of the 1980’s about
the feared harms of photocopying. These include, for example, Novos and Waldman
(1984), and Besen and Kirby (1989). These papers were focused mainly on the cost
and quality of copies, and how the market for copies aﬀects the price of originals
and consumer welfare more generally. In contrast, we assume that digital copies
are faithful to the original, and that the cost of copying is endogenous to the level
of protection, which we take as an optimizing choice of vendors. More recently,
authors have focused on government interventions as a solution to digital copying. For
example, Chen and Png (2003) characterize optimal ﬁnes for copying, in conjunction
with subsidies and taxes, which collectively can mitigate the harms of digital copying.
We follow Conner and Rumelt (1991) in our premise that the threat of copy-
ing will cause vendors to lower their prices. (See Sundararajan (2004) for empirical
evidence for the existence of DRM price eﬀects.) We follow Belleﬂamme (2003) in
noticing that a shared DRM system aﬀects pricing behavior through the threat of
hacking. In Belleﬂamme’s paper, demands would be independent if the vendors had
perfect legal enforcement, but demands become interdependent if hacking is a threat.
We depart from these papers in assuming that the level of protection (cost of hack-
4ing) is an endogenous choice, and in the welfare questions we address. It may be
easier to deter hacking by using independent DRM systems than by using a shared
DRM system. We therefore investigate the choice between independent and shared
protections, and how it compares to what is optimal. We also investigate the eﬀect on
prices of how the shared system is governed, in particular, comparing demand-based
cost sharing with revenue-based cost sharing.
2. The Price-Reducing Eﬀect of Technical Protections
Probably the most severe criticism of intellectual property as an incentive mechanism
is that, in allowing content creators to raise prices to the monopoly level, it creates
deadweight loss by excluding users. Will technical protections exacerbate this problem
or serve as an antidote? One reason the answer is not obvious is that the strength of
protection is an optimizing choice. Even if it is possible to exclude all unauthorized
users, the vendor will not typically ﬁnd it proﬁtable to do so. It may be cheaper to
price so that circumvention is deterred rather than to bear the high costs of imple-
menting a hack proof protection system. The incentive to avoid circumvention and
to avoid the high cost of protection will have a moderating inﬂuence on price.
The assumption here, following Conner and Rumelt (1991), is that a user will
buy a legitimate copy instead of circumventing the protection system whenever the
price of the legitimate copy is lower than the cost of circumvention. The vendor’s
optimizing strategy takes account of this. We also assume that, although individual
circumventors can circumvent without detection, they cannot make the content freely
available on the Internet, or sell a circumvention tool. Those activities would be easily
detectable and would put the circumventor in jeopardy under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act.
We show that technical protection will generally result in a lower market price
than the monopoly price that would be charged with perfect legal enforcement. In
the Appendix, we show that dispersion in the costs of circumvention may exert yet
another downward inﬂuence on price.
To be more concrete, index agents by θ ∈ [0,1], uniformly distributed, and
5suppose that the willingness to pay of agent θ is θ. For each price p, the number of









We assume that the marginal cost of copying is zero. Thus, if copying can be con-
trolled, the monopoly price will be p∗ = 1
2, which maximizes per-period proﬁt,
π(p)=p(1 − p).
However, if the copies cannot be controlled, the demand curve for legitimate copies
falls to zero. Technical protection measures can mitigate this problem.
Index the strength of protection by e ∈ R+, and interpret e as the cost of
circumvention. Formalizing the intuition that the cost of protection increases super-
linearly in the cost of circumvention, denote the cost of implementing protection level
e by K(e) > 0, where K and K0 are increasing. We shall ﬁrst suppose that the cost of
circumvention is the same for all users, namely, e. After the right holder has chosen
the strength of protection, e, he must set a price. If e>p ∗, then the optimal price is
p∗. It is therefore wasteful to implement a protection e>p ∗, since the proprietor does
not need such strong protection in order to charge the monopoly price. If e<p ∗,
the optimal price is p = e, the cost of circumvention. At that price, no users will
circumvent the technical protection measure in equilibrium.
Thus, for any e ≤ p∗, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt as a function of e is π(e) − K(e), where
both π and K are increasing, and π ﬂattens out for e>p ∗. The proﬁt-maximizing
level of protection, say ˆ e, maximizes the diﬀerence between proﬁt and cost, and must
be lower than p∗.T h u s ,
Remark 1. If each user’s cost of circumvention is e when the protection level is
e, the proﬁt-maximizing level of protection ˆ e satisﬁes ˆ e<p ∗, where p∗ is the proﬁt-
maximizing price with perfect legal enforcement. The proﬁt-maximizing price satisﬁes
ˆ p =ˆ e<p ∗. There is no circumvention in equilibrium.
Thus the threat of circumvention lowers the price of content. We show in the
appendix that dispersion in circumvention costs may lower it even more.
6While the price and proﬁt are lower in each period, the technical protection
can continue forever, and may thus be more proﬁtable than perfect legal enforcement,
which eventually expires. This may even be true if the costs K are taken into account.
Moreover, it is not obvious that the threat of circumvention increases consumer welfare,
even though it reduces the per-period price. This is again because the technical
protection can continue indeﬁnitely. In fact, a technical protection system can increase
both consumer welfare and the proprietor’s proﬁt, as compared with perfect legal
enforcement for a limited duration. We will show this in an example, but ﬁrst we
make a preliminary comment on the optimal structure of rewards to creation.
For each p, let DWL(p) be the lost consumers’ surplus at the price p (dead-
weight loss). Remark 2 says that if a lower price is coupled with longer protection to
j u s tt h ee x t e n tt h a tt o t a lp r o ﬁt is preserved, and if this has the eﬀect of reducing the
deadweight-loss-to-proﬁt ratio, consumers are better oﬀ. This ratio test is satisﬁed
for linear demand curves, as assumed here.
By assuming that revenue is held ﬁxed, Remark 2 focuses on the optimal struc-
ture of rewards ex post. It allows us to consider ex post eﬃciency without considering
the ex ante incentive to create. In the remainder of this paper, where we consider gov-
ernance structures for sharing technical protections, the ex ante and ex post eﬃciency
issues are not so easy to disentangle.
Remark 2. Suppose a legal regime lasts T ∗ discounted years1 with monopoly price
p∗, and suppose a technical protection regime lasts T(e) discounted years, T(e) >T ∗
with price p(e) that satisﬁes p(e) <p ∗. Suppose that the revenue earned in both
regimes is the same, π(p(e))T(e)=π(p∗)T ∗. Then consumers are better oﬀ if and
1The length of protection T is taken to be already discounted. If the statutory length of protection
is τ, and the discount rate is r, then T =
R τ
0 e−rtdt. The discounted length of protection, T, cannot
be larger than 1








Proof. Since p(e) <p ∗, the per-period consumers’ surplus is higher, s(p(e)) >s(p∗).










where s(0) = 1
2 is the per-period consumers’ surplus after the protection ends, when







for consumers’ surplus with the technical protection in place. Consumers are better
oﬀ with technical protection of length T(e) if and only if:
[s(0) − s(p
∗)]T
∗ − [s(0) − s(p(e))]T(e) > 0 (2.3)
Remark 2 follows from the observation that the consumers’ surplus that is lost





s(0) − s(p(e)) = π(p(e)) + DWL(p(e))
Then, using T∗π(p∗)=T(e)π(p(e)), the inequality (2.3) holds if and only if (2.2)
holds.
However, this conceptual experiment is not quite the right one for comparing
costless enforcement of copyrights with technical protections. Technical protections
can continue forever — protection will not end at the duration T(e) required for the
2The ratio test for whether a simultaneous price reduction and lengthening of protection helps
consumers was introduced in the antitrust context by Kaplow 1984 to evaluate the desirability of
licensing practices, and in the patent design context by Tandon (1982) and many subsequent authors
(see Scotchmer (2005), chapter 4) to evaluate the desirability of making patents broad or narrow.
The notable feature of the ratio test is that the comparison is reduced to a static one. Even though
deadweight loss lasts longer in the technical protection regime, we only have to observe that the ratio
of deadweight loss to proﬁt is reduced in each period in order to know whether in total the technical
protection regime is better for consumers.
8proﬁt equivalence. Further, technical protections are costly. Nevertheless, this line
of reasoning correctly suggests that technical protections can sometimes make both
creators and consumers better oﬀ. We show this with an example.
Example: As argued above, if there is no dispersion of circumvention costs, the optimal
price with a technical protection is p(e)=e. Thus, consumers’ surplus per period of
time with technical protection is s(p(e)) = 1
2(1 − e)2.






















[e(1 − e) − K(e)] (2.5)









The level of protection that maximizes e(1−e)−K(e)i se = 1
4. The conditions
(2.5) and (2.4) on proﬁt and social surplus are satisﬁed if the discount rate and length







3. Independent Protections versus Shared Protections
We now turn from monopoly to oligopoly, and consider how the pricing of digital
content depends on the protection system. Prices will depend on whether the content
providers implement independent systems or share a common one. If they share a
common one, the market outcome will depend on whether they price independently,
and on how they share the costs of the protection system.
9The table below lays out the cases for comparison, partly as a guide to notation.
Vendors may implement independent systems to protect their content or a shared
one, and they might price independently or collude. When vendors share a protection
system, they must somehow cover their shared protection costs. The three notations
ˆ I,˜ I, ¯ I refer to diﬀerent ways of sharing cost while pricing independently: ﬁxed shares,
or cost shares equal to demand shares or revenue shares, respectively. This section
discusses the price outcomes in the regimes where the cost sharing considerations do
not arise, including the case of a shared system leading directly to collusive pricing
(J). The next section then provides an illustrative example of the results. In section







Independent ˆ I I ˆ I, ˜ I,¯ I
Joint (collude) ˆ C C J
A conclusion of this section is that a shared system can be socially preferable to
independent systems even if the vendors use the shared system to collude. Moreover,
the shared system can be superior even in the narrow sense of reducing prices for
content, even if sharing does not signiﬁcantly lower the costs of protection. The
lower prices are due to the price-moderating eﬀe c to fat h r e a to fc i r c u m v e n t i o n ,w h i c h
operates more powerfully if the vendors share a system than if they use independent
systems. A shared system is more tempting to hackers, since a single hack gives access
to more content. To deter circumvention, the shared protection must be stronger,
hence more costly. Instead of bearing the high cost of joint protection, it may be
cheaper for the vendors to deter circumvention by lowering prices instead.
Even if sharing does not reduce prices, due to collusion, it may have the social
and private beneﬁt of reducing the total cost of protection, since setup costs are only
paid once instead of twice. Balanced against the saving in ﬁxed costs is the fact that
marginal costs of deploying more protection will be higher in a shared system.
Suppose that the ﬁrms face demands D1(p1,p 2),D 2(p1,p 2), each decreasing in
its own price and increasing (nondecreasing) in the other ﬁrm’s price. Some people will
10buy both products, but others will buy only one of the products. In order to focus on
the pure eﬀects of cost sharing or other arrangements that aﬀect prices, we will assume
that the vendors are in symmetric positions, and we focus on symmetric equilibria.
Asymmetries between the vendors, such as in the popularity of their content, will have
additional eﬀects not considered here.
The cost of protection will again be given by a positive function K,w h i c hi n -
cludes ﬁxed costs and increasing marginal costs as the strength of protection increases.
We again assume that there is no dispersion in circumvention costs, and that the level
of protection, e, is calibrated to be the cost of circumvention.
We will ﬁnd it useful to deﬁne revenue functions and proﬁt functions:
Ri(p1,p 2)=piDi(p1,p 2)f o r i = 1,2( 3 . 1)
Π
I
i(p1,p 2)=Ri(p1,p 2) − K(pi) for i = 1,2 (3.2)
We assume throughout that at a suﬃciently high price, each ﬁrm’s demand,
hence revenue, becomes zero, regardless of the other ﬁrm’s price.
In the proﬁt functions ΠI
i (where “I” standards for “independent”), we have
entered pi as the argument in K, recognizing that the optimal choice of price and
protection satisﬁes e = pi for ﬁrm i. “Unused” protection, e>p i, is wasteful, and less
protection, e<p i, would lead to zero revenue.
We deﬁne the following equilibria:
• The prices (p
ˆ I,p




ˆ I) for all p ≥ 0 and symmetrically for ﬁrm 2.
• The prices (pI,p I)a r ea nequilibrium with independent technical protections if
ΠI
1(pI,p I) ≥ ΠI
1(p,pI) for all p ≥ 0, and symmetrically for ﬁrm 2.
We will assume that these symmetric equilibria exist.
As a benchmark, now suppose that the ﬁrms collude, even though they imple-
ment independent protections. We will assume that the proﬁt-maximizing prices are
symmetric. Let (p
ˆ C,p
ˆ C) be the prices that maximize
Π
ˆ C(p1,p 2)=R1(p1,p 2)+R2(p1,p 2) (3.3)
11which is the joint proﬁt with perfect legal enforcement. Let (pC,p C) be the prices
that maximizes joint proﬁt with independent protections, deﬁned as
Π
C(p1,p 2)=R1(p1,p 2)+R2(p1,p 2) − K(p1) − K(p2) (3.4)
For the case of shared protection, let (pJ,p J) be the collusive prices that maximize
joint proﬁt
Π
J(p1,p 2)=R1(p1,p 2)+R2(p1,p 2) − K(p1 + p2) (3.5)
Here we assume that the vendors will choose high enough protection so that all hacking
is deterred, which requires that p1 + p2 ≤ e. We have again substituted p1 + p2 for
e in the cost function. The only plausible alternative would be for the vendors to
choose a level of protection that is higher than each individual price but lower than
the sum. We assume this is not optimal. With this lower level of protection, some
consumers who would otherwise pay for a single product would switch to hacking, and
receive both products at the hacking cost e. And consumers who would otherwise pay
for both products would surely switch to hacking instead of paying. Both changes
in behavior are costly to the producers, especially if many consumers would buy both
products when p1 + p2 ≤ e.
To compare prices, we need some additional assumptions. The price diﬀerences
are due to the fact that, with protection, price can only be increased by incurring the
marginal cost of more protection.
Assumption 1. Given the revenue and proﬁt functions deﬁned above:
(a) The cross-partial derivatives of the revenue and proﬁt functions (3.1)a n d( 3 . 5 )
are nonnegative.
(b) Revenue and proﬁt functions (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5) are quasiconcave
on the domains where they are nonnegative.
12(c) The own derivatives of (3.1) and (3.2), (e.g. ∂
∂p1ΠI
1(p1,p 2),) are decreasing in the


















Ri(p1,p 2) < 0
The cross-partial property in assumption 1(a) also follows for proﬁt functions
(3.2), (3.3), and (3.4). Assumption 1(a) asserts that prices are strategic complements.
Assumption 1(c) ensures that the symmetric equilibria are unique.3
Proposition 1 (A threat of circumvention reduces prices). Suppose that As-
sumption 1 holds.
(a) The symmetric prices that result from perfect legal enforcement are higher than
those that result when vendors use independent DRM systems. That is, p
ˆ I >p I.
(b) The symmetric prices that maximize joint proﬁt with perfect legal enforcement
are higher than those that maximize joint proﬁt with independent DRM systems,
and the latter are higher than the symmetric prices that maximize joint proﬁt
with a shared DRM system. That is, p
ˆ C >p C >p J.
Proof. (a) We use the Corollary to Theorem 6 of Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 and
Theorem 13 of Milgrom and Shannon, 1994. To show p
ˆ I >p I, write
R1(p1,p 2)+tK(p1)
for ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt function (symmetrically, ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt function), and let t ∈ [−1,0]
deﬁne a class of games. Then t = −1 is the proﬁt function (3.2) for the game with
separate technical protections, and t = 0 is the proﬁt function (3.1) for the game with
perfect legal enforcement. The class of games deﬁned by t ∈ [−1,0] are symmetric,
3Suppose that the game is deﬁned by functions Π1 (p1,p 2),Π2 (p1,p 2), which are symmetric,
and that assumption 1 holds. Suppose now that there are two equilibria, (ˆ p, ˆ p)a n d( ˜ p, ˜ p). Then
∂Π1
∂p1 (˜ p, ˜ p)=∂Π1
∂p1 (ˆ p, ˆ p)=0 , so ∂Π1
∂p1 (˜ p, ˜ p) − ∂Π1











dt, which is a
contradiction.
13(smooth) supermodular, and satisfy the single crossing property. Therefore the unique
symmetric equilibrium prices of the games deﬁned by t are increasing in t,s op
ˆ I ≥ pI.
One can see from the derivatives that the inequality is strict.
(b) For p
ˆ C >p C, write the maximand as
R1(p1,p 2)+R2(p1,p 2)+t[K(p1)+K(p2)]
This maximand is supermodular in (p1,p 2) and has increasing diﬀerences in (p1,p 2;t),
(Milgrom and Shannon, 1994, Theorem 6), so the maximum is monotonic in t (Milgrom
and Shannon, 1994, Theorem 5). The value t = −1 represents the optimum of (3.4)
and the value t = 0 represents the optimum of (3.1). Therefore p
ˆ C ≥ pC, and, again,
one can see from the derivative that the inequality is strict.
To show pC >p J write
R1(p1,p 2)+R2(p1,p 2) − [K(p1 + p2)+t(K(p1)+K(p2) − K(p1 + p2))]
Again, by hypothesis this maximand has increasing diﬀerences in (p1,p 2;t), so the
maximum is monotonic in t (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994, Theorems 5 and 6). The
optimum of (3.4) is the maximum where t = 1, and the optimum of (3.5) is the
maximum when t =0 . The result follows.
A shared system can be socially more eﬃcient than independent systems even
if the vendors use the shared system to collude, and even if the collusive prices are
higher than with independent systems. This is because the shared system saves costs.
However, even if the ﬁrms can use a shared system to collude, they will not necessarily
make the eﬃcient decision whether to share.
In the following remark, by competition we mean independent pricing with
independent protection systems, and by collusion we mean maximization of joint proﬁt,
using a shared system. If one is more proﬁtable than the other, then presumably that
is the system the vendors would choose, even if it not eﬃcient. Eﬃciency in this
remark means from an ex post point of view, namely, that the deadweight loss plus
the cost of the protection system is smaller in the more eﬃcient arrangement. However,
reducing proﬁt may reduce the incentives to create content, which also entails a social
cost. In this remark, we are not taking that cost into account.
14Remark 3 (Ex post eﬃciency, and the choice among protection systems).
(a) If pI >p J and 2K(pI) <K (2pJ), competition is more proﬁtable for content
providers than collusion, although collusion might be socially more eﬃcient.
(b) If pI >p J and 2K(pI) >K (2pJ), competition might be more proﬁtable for the
content providers than collusion, although collusion is socially more eﬃcient.
(c) If pI <p J and 2K(pI) >K (2pJ), collusion is more proﬁtable for the content
providers than competition, although competition might be socially more eﬃ-
cient.
(d) If pI <p J and 2K(pI) <K(2pJ), collusion might be more proﬁtable for the con-
tent providers than competition, although competition is socially more eﬃcient.
The example in the next section illustrates that the vendors will not always
choose the more eﬃcient arrangement as to sharing or using independent DRM sys-
tems.
4. Collusion versus Independent Pricing: An Example
In the previous section we compared the prices charged by vendors who can perfectly
enforce their legal rights and with the prices charged by vendors who use indepen-
dent protection systems. We also compared collusive prices, assuming, respectively,
that the content of vendors is legally enforced, that they use independent protection
systems, and that they share a common system. Proposition 1 summarizes these
comparisons, but conspicuously omits a comparison of collusive prices with competi-
tive prices, when using DRM. Oddly, the comparison can go either way, as we now
show. More precisely, the competitive prices pI (also p
ˆ I)c a nb el o w e ro rh i g h e rt h a n
prices with a shared system and collusion, pJ.
Because the products are substitutes, collusion has a tendency to raise price
relative to independent pricing with perfect legal enforcement, p
ˆ I, and relative to
competition with legal enforcement, pI. But because joint protection is more costly
15than independent protection (or no protection), there is an oﬀsetting eﬀect. Perhaps
counterintuitively, it may occur that pJ <p
ˆ I,p I. As a consequence, consumers can
beneﬁt from consolidation through a DRM system, even if it leads to collusive pricing.
We now give an example to show what the comparison depends on. Consider
two ﬁrms 1,2, each facing a demand for its content that depends negatively on its own
price and positively on the competitor’s price. Let ﬁrm 1’s demand be deﬁned as
D1(p1,p 2)=m a x {1 − p1 + cp2,0} (4.1)
where 0 ≤ p1,p 2 ≤ 1,a n d0≤ c ≤ 1. The parameter c determines the degree of
substitutability between the two products. Firm 2’s demand is symmetrically deﬁned.
Let the costs of protection be deﬁned by
K(e)=k + κe
2
so that k is a ﬁxed cost and 2κe is the marginal cost of increasing the cost of circum-
vention.
When the ﬁrms compete using independent protection systems, ﬁrm 1’s best
response function is
1+cp2
2+2κ (symmetrically for ﬁrm 2), and the symmetric Nash equi-









(2 + 2κ − c)2 − k (4.3)
As noted previously, technical protection moderates the price of content (with
κ > 0), compared to perfect legal protection. The equilibrium price with perfect legal
enforcement would be p
ˆ I = 1
2−c, which is higher than pI.
Suppose now that ﬁrms own a technical protection system as a joint monopolist.
The level of protection must satisfy e ≥ p1+p2, and this inequality will be satisﬁed as
an equality. The ﬁrms maximize joint proﬁt (3.5). The symmetric proﬁt-maximizing









(2 + 4κ − 2c)
2 − k (4.5)
16Proposition 2 (Pricing with linear demand, quadratic protection costs). In
the context of the above model with linear demand and quadratic protection costs, the
proﬁt-maximizing prices with a shared protection system, (pJ,p J), are higher than the
competitive prices with separate protection systems, (pI,p I),i f2κ <c ,a n do t h e r w i s e
are lower.
The proof follows directly from comparing the expressions (4.2) and (4.4). The
price-moderating eﬀect of the shared protection is increasing in κ, but the collusive
eﬀect of joint pricing is increasing in c. The latter eﬀect dominates if 2κ <c .
Aside from any strategic beneﬁt due to coordinating prices, vendors have an
incentive to share a technical protection system in order to save ﬁxed costs. This
incentive is oﬀset by the higher marginal costs of protection in a shared system, which
will also cause the price to be lower. As noted in remark 4, therefore, depending
on the relative magnitudes of these eﬀects, ﬁrms may or may not prefer the more
socially eﬃcient system. Moreover, a shared protection system may be beneﬁcial to
both consumers and vendors.
Suppose, for example, that the demands for the content are independent (c =0 )
and marginal costs for protection are positive, (κ > 0.) According to Proposition 2,
the pI >p J, so consumers prefer the shared system, even with collusive pricing. Now
consider the ﬁrm’s proﬁts given by (4.3) and (4.5), noting that each ﬁrm gets half the





2(1 +2 κ)2 <k (4.6)
Therefore, if (4.6) holds, vendors and consumers both prefer shared protection.
From an aggregated standpoint, shared protections are better when 2s(p
J)+πJ >
2s(p
I)+2 πI, which holds if
(1 +2 κ)2
4(1 + κ)2 −
(1 +4 κ)2





2(1 +2 κ)2 <k (4.7)
Because the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst two terms of (4.7) is negative, (4.7) holds if
(4.6) holds, but not necessarily vice versa. Thus, for a wide range of parameter values,
ﬁrms will be too reluctant to share a system, relative to what is eﬃcient.
17Suppose now that c>0a n dκ =0 . T h e npI >p J, so consumers are un-
ambiguously worse oﬀ with collusion than with competitive pricing and independent
protections. Comparing (4.3) and (4.5), for all k ≥ 0,c > 0, we ﬁnd that πI < πJ
2 .
Since the collusive prices are higher than the competitive prices, and the total costs
are smaller, proﬁts are higher with joint protection.
Perhaps the most notable conclusion is that, depending on the relative mag-
nitude of the collusive eﬀects and cost advantages, collusive pricing with a shared
protection system may be socially and privately preferable to the competitive out-
come with independent protections.
5. Independent Pricing and Cost Sharing
We have so far compared competition when vendors use independent systems with
collusion when they use a shared system. However, these are not the only options. In
those situations where collusive pricing is not socially preferable, it may be possible
to have both the cost advantages of a shared system and the competitive beneﬁts of
independent pricing. In this section we ask whether, by appropriate choice of the
technology, competition can be maintained even though the vendors share a DRM
system. One can imagine a shared technology that gives to each vendor the ability
to enter its own price, to be administered by the system. With such a technology,
pricing is independent. However, the vendors must share the costs of the system, and
the cost sharing arrangement may itself lead to collusion.
We center our discussion on three cost sharing schemes:
1. independent pricing with demand-based cost shares (cost shares equal to shares
of total downloads) (notation ˜ I);
2. independent pricing with revenue-based cost shares (cost shares equal to revenue
shares) (notation ¯ I);
3. independent pricing with ﬁxed cost shares (notation ˆ I).
We use pJ as a collusive benchmark against which to consider pricing under
these cost sharing rules. Together with the level of protection, e, each cost sharing
18r u l el e a d st oad i ﬀerent proﬁt function, and therefore a diﬀerent game played by the
content providers. Proposition 3 suggests that the three cost sharing schemes are listed
above in decreasing order of collusiveness. It is almost obvious that option 3, ﬁxed
cost shares, leads to the outcome with perfect legal enforcement, p
ˆ I. More interesting
are cases 1 and 2.
To deﬁne the games that result from the ﬁrst and second cost sharing rules, we
deﬁne cost shares ˜ α and ¯ α as follows for ﬁrm 1 (and symmetrically for ﬁrm 2).
˜ α1(p1,p 2)=
( D1(p1,p2)
D1(p1,p2)+D2(p1,p2) if D1(p1,p 2)+D2(p1,p 2) > 0




R1(p1,p2)+R2(p1,p2) if R1(p1,p 2)+R2(p1,p 2) > 0
1/2i f R1(p1,p 2)+R2(p1,p 2)=0
(5.2)
The conclusions below about independent pricing can largely be understood
by examining the cost sharing rules. The demand-based cost share ˜ α1 is increasing
with demand D1 and decreasing with the other ﬁrm’s demand, D2, hence decreasing
with the vendor’s own price p1. By increasing price, the vendor reduces its cost
share, which makes a high price more attractive than it otherwise would be. This
suggests that with demand-based cost sharing, prices will be higher than with ﬁxed
cost shares.
The revenue-based cost share ¯ α1 can be either increasing or decreasing with
p1, since R1 can be either increasing or decreasing with p1. Even if the cost share ¯ α1
decreases with p1 like ˜ α1, it decreases at a smaller rate — revenue decreases less quickly
than demand as price rises, because the increase in price oﬀsets the fall in demand.
This suggests that there is less incentive to raise price with revenue-based cost sharing
than with demand-based cost sharing, and that prices will be lower. These intuitions
are correct, but they are incomplete because they do not take account of the strategic
interaction between the ﬁrms, and they do not use the fact that the ﬁrms can constrain
their pricing by choice of e, the level of protection.
The proﬁt functions for ﬁrm 1 (symmetrically for ﬁrm 2) in games 1,2a n d3
are the following, conditional on the cost of protection K (e):
19˜ π1(p1,p 2;e)=
(
R1(p1,p 2) − ˜ α1(p1,p 2)K(e)i fp1 + p2 ≤ e
−(1/2)K(e)i f p1 + p2 >e
¯ π1(p1,p 2;e)=
(
R1(p1,p 2) − ¯ α1(p1,p 2)K(e)i fp1 + p2 ≤ e
−(1/2)K(e)i f p1 + p2 >e (5.3)
ˆ π1(p1,p 2;e)=
(
R1(p1,p 2) − ˆ α1K(e)i f p1 + p2 ≤ e
−ˆ α1K(e)i f p1 + p2 >e
where (ˆ α1, ˆ α2)a r eﬁxed and sum to 1.
The sequence of choices in each of the three games is that the vendors ﬁrst
choose e,w h i c hi st h e nﬁxed, after which they compete on price.4 In the three
diﬀerent games, the vendors maximize the diﬀerent proﬁt functions deﬁned by (5.3).
In each game, the no-hacking constraint implies that the symmetric price is bounded
above by e/2. Before coming to that, however, in Proposition 3 we sort out the
pure eﬀect of cost sharing on price competition, ignoring the no-hacking constraint
p1 + p2 ≤ e.
Consider the following proﬁt functions for ﬁrm 1 (symmetrically for ﬁrm 2),
which are the same as (5.3), but without the no-hacking constraint p1 + p2 ≤ e.
˜ π
K
1 (p1,p 2)=R1(p1,p 2) − ˜ α1(p1,p 2)K
¯ π
K
1 (p1,p 2)=R1(p1,p 2) − ¯ α1(p1,p 2)K (5.4)
ˆ π
K




ˆ I (K) be, respectively, symmetric equilibrium prices in the games
deﬁned by these proﬁtf u n c t i o n s . I ti sc l e a rt h a tf o ra l lK, the symmetric equilibrium
p
ˆ I (K) of the game with proﬁt functions ˆ πK
1 , ˆ πK
2 satisﬁes p
ˆ I (K)=p
ˆ I, where p
ˆ I is the
symmetric equilibrium price deﬁned above for perfect legal enforcement. To compare
prices, we make additional assumptions on the proﬁt functions.
4One of the diﬃculties in the asymmetric case is that the vendors may disagree about the level
o fp r o t e c t i o ni nt h eﬁrst place, which would introduce a bargaining problem. By focusing on the
symmetric case, we can separate out our investigation of cost sharing rules, without cluttering the
analysis with that bargaining issue.
20Assumption 2. For the revenue and proﬁt functions deﬁn e di n( 3 . 1) and (5.4),
(a) The cross-partial derivatives are non-negative.
(b) The proﬁt functions are quasiconcave in own price on domains where proﬁti s
positive.5
(c) The own derivatives of the proﬁt functions, such as ∂
∂p1˜ πK
1 (p,p), are decreasing in











1 (p,p) < 0
(d) Firm 1’s revenue function (similarly, ﬁrm 2’s revenue function) satisﬁes
∂
∂p1




R1 (p,p) < 0 for p>p
ˆ I
These assumptions are non-primitive, but not unreasonable, at least in the domains
that aﬀect optimizing choices. As before, assumption 2(c) implies that there is a
unique symmetric equilibrium. Note that, as before, we are restricting attention to
the case where symmetric equilibria exist, which is, among other things, an assump-
tion on the level of costs. If costs are high enough that the symmetric prices result in
negative proﬁts, but that a single ﬁrm could make positive proﬁts, there is no sym-
metric equilibrium, and possibly no equilibrium in pure strategies at all, due to the
discontinuity in the proﬁt functions.
Proposition 3 (The pure eﬀe c to fc o s ts h a r i n go np r i c e s ) .Suppose that assump-
tion 2 holds. Given K>0, let p
ˆ I, p
¯ I(K), p
˜ I(K) be unique symmetric equilibria of
the games deﬁned by the proﬁt functions (5.4), and suppose that the vendors earn
positive proﬁts in the equilibria. Then p
ˆ I ≤ p
¯ I (K) <p
˜ I (K) with strict inequality if
the cross partials of revenue functions are positive. Further, p
ˆ I(·),p
˜ I(·) are increasing.
5But it would not be reasonable to assume that the proﬁt functions are quasiconcave on the whole
domain. Consider the proﬁt function ¯ πK
1 . If ﬁrm 2 is pricing so that it earns positive revenue, ﬁrm
1 can earn zero revenue and zero proﬁts by pricing very low or very high. At intermediate prices
that generate revenue, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt may be negative because it must share the costs. But then the
proﬁt function is not quasiconcave.
21Proof. We ﬁrst show that at this equilibrium, p
ˆ I <p
¯ I (K). The ﬁrst-order condi-









R1 (p1,p 2) − K
∂
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If p1 = p2 ≤ p
ˆ I,t h e n ∂
∂p1R1 (p1,p 2) ≥ 0, and ∂
∂p1R1 (p1,p 2)+ ∂
∂p1R2 (p1,p 2) ≥ 0, the
latter with strict inequality if the cross partial of R2 is positive. Proﬁt is positive if





> 0. Therefore, at p1 = p2 <p
ˆ I, (5.6)
is zero or positive, depending on whether the cross partial of R2 is zero or positive.
Since the own derivative ∂
∂p1¯ πK
1 (p1,p 2) is monotonic at symmetric prices, a symmetric
equilibrium must therefore satisfy p
ˆ I ≤ p
¯ I (K), with strict inequality if the cross partial
of R2 is positive.
We now show that p
¯ I (K) <p











1 (p1,p 2) −
KR1 (p1,p 2)






R1 (p1,p 2)+R2 (p1,p 2)
!
D1 (p1,p 2)
Thus, at every symmetric price, p1 = p2, ∂
∂p1˜ πK
1 (p1,p 2) > ∂
∂p1¯ πK
1 (p1,p 2), and similarly
for ﬁrm 2, and therefore the only symmetric equilibrium is at higher prices.
That p
ˆ I(·),p
˜ I(·) are increasing follows from uniqueness of equilibrium and the
monotone-comparative-statics theorems (Theorem 6 of Milgrom and Roberts (1990)
or Theorem 13 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994)).
We now return to the question of the vendors’ choice of e (and hence K.)
By the no-hacking constraint, p1 + p2 ≤ e, t h ec h o i c eo fe can serve as a price cap
for the competing vendors. However, Proposition 3 suggests another role for costly
22protection, namely, to give the competing ﬁrms an incentive to raise price. The
eﬀectiveness of this incentive depends on how much cost the ﬁrm can avoid by raising
price and decreasing its cost share. If the incentive to pull up prices up to the collusive
level pJ is strong enough, then the collusive outcome can be achieved by using eJ as
a price cap. However, there is no reason that prices must be pulled up that far by
K(eJ). If not, the ﬁrms may choose a level of protection higher than necessary to
prevent hacking, as a way to commit to high prices. This strategy also wastes costs.
We now show that whether the ﬁrms can support the collusive outcome, and
support it without wasting costs, depends on how much of the cost is ﬁxed, that is,
independent of the level of protection. We state this result as Proposition 4, and prove
it using Lemma 1. We add the following assumption about cost:
Assumption 3. The cost of protection K(e) can be written K(e)=k + κ(e) where
κ is convex, positive, and increasing.
For intuition on how costs aﬀect equilibrium prices, refer to Figure 1.F i g u r e
1 depicts symmetric equilibrium prices p
¯ I (κ(e)) for the game with revenue-based cost
sharing. Figure 1 shows that the equilibrium price is increasing in κ(e), hence
increasing in e. (A similar diagram for demand-based cost sharing would have the
same feature.) Figure 1 also shows that p
¯ I (k + κ(e)) >p
¯ I (κ(e)) for k>0: if the cost
of protection increases, in particular, because the ﬁxed costs increase, the symmetric
equilibrium prices also increase.
Part (a) of Lemma 1 says that, for high enough ﬁxed costs, the collusive prices
are an equilibrium without wasted costs. That is, if the costs are already high enough,
the ﬁrms do not have to artiﬁcially increase costs by increasing the level of protection
e in order to sustain the collusive prices.
Part (b) says that, to achieve the collusive prices without excessive protection
e, the ﬁxed costs must be even higher with revenue-based cost sharing than with
demand-based cost sharing. This is for the reason explored above, that revenue-based
cost sharing makes it harder to sustain high prices. Part (b) also says that if the






































Figure 1: Equilibrium prices increase when the cost of protection increases  
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I κ  protection, then the ﬁrms can either sustain prices below the collusive price or can
sustain the collusive price with excessive protection (or, implicitly, some of each).
Part (c) suggests that demand-based cost sharing is more supportive of collu-
sion than revenue-based cost sharing.
Let pJ be the optimum of (3.5), using assumption 3. Notice that we can write
pJ without any ambiguity as k varies, because the optimum does not depend on k.
Lemma 1. Suppose that assumptions 2 and 3 hold, that ﬁrms make positive proﬁt
in equilibrium when k =0 , and that symmetric equilibrium prices satisfy p











































J if k ≥ ¯ k
(b) Given κ(e),˜ k,a n d¯ k deﬁned above,








˜ I (k + κ(e)) = p
J only if e>e
J.








¯ I (k + κ(e)) = p
J only if e>e
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Proof. For Lemma 1(a), we must establish that there exists ¯ k high enough that the



























¯ k + κ(e)
R1 (pJ,p J)+R2 (pJ,p J)
!
> 0 (5.9)
By Proposition 3, the function of k deﬁned by p
¯ I (k + κ(e)) is increasing. Let ¯ k behigh
enough so that p
¯ I (k + κ(e)) = pJ as in ﬁgure 1, so that (5.8) holds. (In particular,










−κ(2pJ) > 0.) Using the expression for the




















< 0, since pJ >p
ˆ I, (5.8) implies (5.9). A similar




¯ I (k + κ(e)) <p
˜ I (k + κ(e)) by Proposition 3, and since both prices are
increasing in k, it follows that ¯ k>˜ k.
Lemma 1(b) follows from Lemma 1(a) and Proposition 3, as follows. By Propo-
























˜ I (k + κ(e)) = pJ implies e>e J. A similar argument applies
for p
¯ I (k + κ(e)).
2(c) follows from 2(a) and 2(b).
W ec o n s i d e rt h ec a s et h a tp
ˆ I <p J, since otherwise collusion should not be
m u c ho fac o n c e r n .
Proposition 4 (The collusive eﬀe c to fc o s ts h a r i n g ) .Suppose that assumptions
2a n d3h o l da n dt h a tp
ˆ I <p J.
(a) Regardless of whether the vendors share costs according to revenue or demand,
for high enough ﬁxed costs of protection (high enough k), the equilibrium price
will be the collusive price pJ,a n deJ =2 pJ.
(b) Demand-based cost sharing supports the collusive price whenever revenue-based
cost sharing does so, but not vice versa.
(c) The ﬁrms’ equilibrium proﬁts are higher (no lower) with demand-based cost shar-
ing than with revenue-based cost sharing.
Proof. (a) follows from Lemma 1(a).
(b) follows from Lemma 1(c).
(c) Given e, there are three cases:
p
J (K (e)) <p
¯ I (K (e)) <p
˜ I (K (e))
p
¯ I (K (e)) <p
J (K (e)) <p
˜ I (K (e))
p
¯ I (K (e)) <p
˜ I (K (e)) <p
J (K (e))
26If the ﬁrst case applies at e = eJ,t h eﬁrms can support the collusive price without
waste, using either demand-based or revenue-based cost sharing. If the second case
applies at e = eJ, demand-based cost sharing can support the collusive price without
waste, but revenue-based cost sharing cannot. If the third case applies at e = eJ,
the collusive prices cannot be supported without waste, with either demand-based
or revenue-based cost sharing. But a higher price can be supported at each e with
demand-based cost sharing than with revenue-based cost sharing. Since joint proﬁt
is rising in the symmetric price for p<p J, the higher price is more proﬁtable.
6. Collusion through Technology
Because the technological capability of the DRM system has important eﬀects on
prices, the technology deployed should not be irrelevant to the antitrust authorities.
The vendors, users, and antitrust authorities will typically have diﬀerent preferences
as to which capabilities should be deployed. But it is not obvious what the right
antitrust objective should be, given that the protected content generally has copyright
protection in the ﬁrst place, and given that the DRM system will dissipate proﬁts
that might otherwise reward creators for creating their content. Should the antitrust
objective be one of pJ,p I,p
ˆ I, perhaps the lowest one? Or should the antitrust objective
be explicitly procedural, such as insisting that the vendors implement independent
systems? Should the antitrust authorities allow a shared system only under the proviso
that the technology facilitate independent pricing? Should it at the same time create
rules as to royalties or cost sharing?
As we pointed out in Remark 3, the prices pI that result from independent
protections may or may not be lower than the collusive price with a shared system,
pJ. But even if higher, the vendors’ proﬁt may be lower because the costs of protection
are higher. Thus, the antitrust authorities cannot avoid the tradeoﬀ between incentives
for vendors and access for users at low prices.
In the previous section we showed that competition between the vendors sharing
as y s t e mi sa ﬀected by two important aspects of the governance structure:
27• whether they set prices independently, and
• how they share costs.
Independent pricing is surely the most important aspect: if the subsidiary sets
prices on behalf of the vendors jointly, or sets a royalty that is then redistributed to
the vendor-owners of the DRM subsidiary, it will surely support the collusive prices
pJ. Whether there is independence in price-setting depends on the technological ca-
pabilities of the DRM system, but the incentive to price competitively also depends
on the cost sharing arrangement.
But if independent pricing is the objective, how can it be assured? A natural
scheme would be to create a technical capability for each vendor to key in its own
price, unrelated to the other vendors’ prices. As we argued at the end of the last
section, that system may or may not sustain the collusive price pJ, depending partly
on how costs are shared. It is more likely to sustain the collusive price if the vendors
share cost according to demand rather than revenue. If low prices are the goal, the
antitrust authorities may favor revenue-based cost sharing.
Suppose, on the other hand, that a DRM system that decrypts and authorizes
through a call-home system imposes a price-per-view for all content (or charges a
royalty per view,) and distributes the net proﬁt to the vendors proportionately to
the revenue generated by the content. If the DRM can implement a single price, it
is reasonable to suppose that, acting on behalf of its vendor-owners, the subsidiary
would choose the proﬁt-maximizing price and level of protection. In the symmetric
case considered here, the best price would be the ﬁrst-best collusive outcome (although
a common price would be a second-best solution if content varied in popularity). The
vendors would surely approve if the DRM system implemented this, at least if it could
prevent cheating.
But the DRM cartel, like all cartels, must worry about price cutting. An
obvious way for a vendor to cheat the cartel is to oﬀer rebates to customers outside
the system, and thus increase its demand. This would ordinarily be a capability
favored by antitrust authorities, but it comes at the price of privacy. The vendors
can only circumvent the common price with rebates if they know who the purchasers
28are. In choosing the technical capabilities of the DRM system, there may be a conﬂict
between privacy and competition policy. In yet another twist, however, rebates on the
side cannot be reﬂected in the cost sharing scheme, which will have to be demand-based
rather than revenue-based. We have already shown that demand-based cost sharing
has greater potential to support the collusive price, and vendors may therefore forego
the opportunity to make rebates, even if that were possible.
Finally, it is possible that the subsidiary covers the costs of the protection
system by charging a royalty per view, while the vendors charge independent prices.
But unless the DRM system is “rate regulated,” there will still be proﬁto rl o s sw h i c h
must be apportioned between the vendors. If the subsidiary charges a royalty equal to
the collusive price, and if the total proﬁt or loss is apportioned according to revenue
shares, then the vendors’ individual proﬁts are their own revenues minutes revenue-
based cost shares. The vendors will prefer the collusive outcome, but will have an
incentive to break the royalty-supported cartel, for example, by making price rebates,
in the same circumstances as with revenue-based cost sharing.
7. Conclusions and Open Questions
In addition to exploring price consequences of a shared DRM system, we also explored
the divergence between the private incentive to create a shared system and the cir-
cumstances in which that would be eﬃcient. There are two incentives for content
providers to share a system. One is that it saves the ﬁxed costs of implementing and
administering the system. The other is that it may give them an opportunity for coor-
dinated or collusive pricing. One of these is in the public interest, and the other may
not be. But collusive pricing is less a threat than it appears because a shared system
is an attractive target for circumvention, and the ﬁrms can reduce circumvention by
lowering prices. In addition, the technology might conceivably maintain independence
in pricing, which has some potential for avoiding collusion, especially if cost shares
are based on revenue rather than demand. Of course the vendors would not typically
want to choose a technical system that avoids collusion.
The welfare implications are ambiguous. Technical protections are expensive.
29The expense is a social waste, as compared to perfect legal enforcement. Content
providers are burdened in two ways: by the cost of protection and by the lower prices
they receive for access to the content. In the end, smaller rewards for content providers
will mute the creative impulse. Nevertheless, we have found a silver lining, namely,
that the threat of hacking leads to lower prices, whether vendors choose independent
systems or collude through a shared system.
The pricing options we have investigated do not exhaust the possibilities sug-
gested in the introduction. The systems we have considered govern the pricing of
content, rather than players, and content itself can be priced in diﬀerent ways, de-
pending on how use can be metered. Content today can be purchased on physical
media, giving the right to unlimited or only a few viewings, or it can be purchased on a
per-viewing basis such as video-on-demand. Subscription services like cable television
bundle these services in yet another way, by giving unlimited viewings per unit time.
Basing royalties on usage has the virtue of taxing the more popular content and the
higher-demand users more highly. It may thus reduce distortions as compared, for
example, to putting the royalty on media players or charging a ﬁxed royalty per unit
time. Taxing the media players will presumably create distortions at the “extensive
margin,” that is, in the number of users in the market. The competitive eﬀects of
what is priced have not yet been explored.
8. Appendix: Prices with Dispersion in Circumvention Costs
In this appendix, we show that the price-reducing eﬀect of a threat of circumvention
holds also with dispersion in circumvention costs, with the diﬀerence that there will
be circumvention in equilibrium, which compounds the proﬁtl o s s .
We deﬁne an “eﬀective” demand curve that recognizes that some agents may
circumvent rather than buy legitimate copies. To deﬁne the eﬀective demand curve,
assume that each user will buy if both his willingness to pay and his personal cost
of circumvention, say c, are higher than the price. Agent θ will buy if θ,c≥ p. He
will circumvent if both his willingness to pay and the price are higher than his cost
of circumvention, θ,p≥ c. Suppose that the costs of circumvention are distributed
30according to a distribution function G with density g, independently of θ, such that,
if e>e 0, then G(·;e) stochastically dominates G(·;e0).6 At the price and protection
(p,e), the demand for legitimate copies is
(1 − p)(1 − G(p;e))
The term (1 − p) represents the fraction of consumers for whom willingness to pay is
higher than the price, and the term (1−G(p;e)) represents the fraction for whom the
circumvention cost is higher than the price.
The proprietor’s proﬁti s
Π(p,e)=p(1 − p)(1 − G(p;e)) − K(e)( 8 . 1)
For each e, let p(e) be the price that maximizes Π(p,e). Given this setup, we
can prove the following:
Remark 4. When the costs of circumvention are dispersed, for every e, p(e) <p ∗.
Suppose that the costs of circumvention are uniformly distributed with expected value
e when the protection level is e. If ˆ e, ˜ e are respectively the proﬁt-maximizing protection
levels when circumvention costs are not dispersed and when dispersed uniformly, then
p(˜ e) < ˆ e<p ∗.
Since Π(p,e) <p (1 − p)a te v e r yp,e, proﬁt is smaller with technical protec-
tion than with perfect legal enforcement. The optimal proprietary price, say p(e),








− p(1 − p)g(p;e)
#¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
p=p(e)
=0 ( 8 . 2 )
Since the derivative is negative whenever
∂p(1−p)
∂p ≤ 0, the optimal price p(e)i sl o w e r
than the monopoly price, p∗ = 1
2, regardless of e.
The proprietor also optimizes with respect to the level of protection e. The
derivative of Π with respect to e is
∂
∂e





6That is, G(c;e0) >G (c;e) for every c in the support of G.
31The ﬁrst term, which is positive since
∂G(p;e)
∂e < 0, represents the saved revenue due
to a decrease in circumvention if e is increased, and the second term represents the










¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
p=p(e)
− K
0(e) = 0 (8.4)
It is easy to see in an example that dispersion in circumvention costs can cause
the proprietor to charge a lower price than without dispersion. Suppose that K0 is
increasing and that the distribution of circumvention costs is uniform on an interval
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It follows from (8.3) that the optimal (p,e) entails both circumvention and
purchases, so that 0 < 1 − G(p;e) < 1. It follows from (8.2) that p(e)i si n c r e a s i n g




∂e is less than one. It then follows from (8.4) that the
optimal strength of protection is smaller when circumvention costs are dispersed than
when not, as follows.
Let ˜ e be the optimal protection when circumvention costs are dispersed, and ˆ e
when not. Then
∂p(1−p)
∂p |p=ˆ e = K0 (ˆ e). It follows from (8.4) that p(ˆ e) < ˆ e. (In fact,
at any given protection level e, not only ˆ e, t h eo p t i m a lp r i c ei sl o w e rw i t hd i s p e r s e d
circumvention costs than with no dispersion.) Then if ˜ e<ˆ e, it follows that p(˜ e) <
p(ˆ e) < ˆ e; the optimal price is lower with dispersed circumvention costs than not.
Suppose instead that ˆ e ≤ ˜ e, which implies that K0(ˆ e) ≤ K0(˜ e)a n dp(ˆ e) ≤ p(˜ e).
Then using (8.4), it follows that
∂p(1−p)
∂p |p=p(˜ e) >
∂p(1−p)
∂p |p=ˆ e which again implies that
p(˜ e) < ˆ e.
Thus, in a plausible example, dispersion in the costs of circumvention decreases
the price of content, but also decreases the proprietor’s proﬁt. In addition, there will
be consumers who circumvent the protection in equilibrium, adding to social costs.
32Consumers’ surplus plus proﬁt in each period, designated W (p,e), is
W (p,e)=s(p)+p(1 − p)+
Z p
0







θ G(θ;e) dθ − C(p,e)
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